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1. Introduction  
This chapter aims to analyze and clarify some fundamental issues in language, reading and 
dyslexia research. In particular, questions and problems concerning definition, explanation 
and understanding are addressed. A central idea is that the cognitive and linguistic 
approach has had a limited significance when it comes to explanation of causal mechanisms 
in reading and dyslexia research. The reasoning brought forward in this chapter takes as 
starting point that we first need precise definitions of the phenomena to be studied, such as 
‘reading’, ‘dyslexia’ and ‘language’, before we choose methods that in a best possible way 
may capture the important characteristics of the phenomenon. In the field of reading and 
dyslexia ‘skill’ is emphasized as an important phenomenon, and the core of this concept is 
considered to be potentiality. We suggest that language primarily should be defined as a 
skill and not as a system that exist more or less independently of humans and speech acts. 
The position taken is that mainstream definitions of ‘language’ are not well suited for the 
empirical study of language skills, because they were formulated to serve other objectives. 
Inspired by the philosophy of science from Karl Popper we suggest that the study of 
language, reading and dyslexia must be based on a more radical and consequent 
empiricism. First, we will present some characteristics of the cognitive and linguistic 
approach to reading and dyslexia. Second, we will identify some problems and limitations 
in this approach. In our suggestions for future research we first focus on conditions that 
should be imposed on definitions in research. Next, we propose a definition of ’skill’ in 
general and ’language skill’ in particular.  
2. The cognitive and linguistic turn 
Although dyslexia research had its early start in the late 1800 century, the broad interest and 
increase of research activity in this field took place first in the 1970s. When we take a 
historical view on dyslexia research, there are remarkably few critical presentations of the 
historical development. The short presentations that exist have in common that they lack 
analyses grounded in philosophy of science. In this part of the chapter we will raise some 
fundamental questions and point at possible answers with relevance for this field of 
research.  
Since the different researchers and approaches use somewhat different terminology, it is 
difficult to capture and categorize the history of dyslexia with concepts from a specific 
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tradition. With some reservation we believe that we may lend inspiration from the history of 
medicine. However, this does not mean that we claim the medical approach to be the most 
fruitful. In the historical overviews – which are remarkably few - over the history of dyslexia 
research we have not found any better classification ( c.f. Miles & Miles, 2001; Beaton, 2004; 
Sawyer, 2006; Vellutino et. al., 2004; Shaywitz, 2006; Collins & Rourke, 2003; Alexander & 
Fox, 2004)  
A first preliminary sorting involves a distinction between practical and theoretical research.  
In the history of dyslexia research these approaches overlap and have been mutually 
beneficial.  Until 1970, the focus and emphasis was on practical research, while the 
theoretical research later on has increased in volume and importance. In the early start of 
dyslexia research the studies emerged from clinical and practical work with students and 
patients. If we use the medical terminology, the main emphasis was on diagnosis, treatment 
and prognosis. In the later theoretical approach there has been a larger emphasis on 
symptoms, causal mechanisms and aetiology.  
As we in the following will concentrate more on the theoretical approach, we will illustrate 
the terminology with some examples from this part of the history of dyslexia research. In the 
1920s it was common to claim that ‘inversion’ - or mirror images of letters and words - was 
common in reading and writing among dyslexics. The term ‘strephosymbolia’ (distorted 
symbols) was therefore used instead of ‘wordblindness’ which was then the most common 
term. The neurologist Samuel Orton explained the mechanism underlying these symptoms 
by referring to the interplay between the two hemispheres of the brain. He claimed that 
when the signals from the hemispheres are processed in a way that they distract one 
another, a distortion in the perception occurs.  In this way Orton described the locus and the 
sequence of events related to the problem, but important questions remained: Why have 
some people abnormal interplay between the hemispheres? The answer resided in the 
aetiology. The anatomic proportions and physiological functions are abnormal due to 
genetic or environmental factors. In this example we see the importance of distinguishing 
between the causal mechanisms, which are manifested every time a reading error occurs, 
and the aetiology which describes why these causal mechanisms occur in some people. 
The interest in achieving a highly precise and complete description of the symptoms of 
dyslexia has varied a lot over the history. The Norwegian researcher Hans Jørgen Gjessing 
was among the pioneers in this area. He asserted in the late 1950s  5 groups of symptoms 
(Gjessing, 1986). Most known is, however, Elena Boders three groups from the end of the 
1960s (Boder, 1973). She claimed that the first group – called ‘dyseidetic’ – was characterised 
by symptoms that could be traced back to causal mechanisms in the visual system. The 
second group consisted of symptoms that could be traced back to causal mechanisms in the 
auditive system. It is somewhat misleading, however, when she calls the latter symptoms 
‘dysphonetic’, inasmuch as phonological and auditive phenomena are not identical.  The 
third group, which combines these two, was called ‘alexic’.  
From the 1970s the focus shifted from description and categorization of symptoms. From 
this time on emphasis was put on the fact that the main problem of dyslexics was to read or 
write unknown words. The errors dyslexics made when reading and writing nonsense 
words were extensively used to describe the symptoms of dyslexics. With reference to the 
issue of language raised in this chapter, a question of definition becomes pertinent: does this 
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reading involve language?  Inasmuch as these words do not have meaning, and given that 
phonemes are defined as the smallest meaning differentiating unit in language, the sounds 
elicited from reading a nonsense word cannot be defined as phonemes.  
The description and categorization of symptoms in reading and writing behaviour could 
make use of methods from the behaviouristic tradition. The rising volume of research from 
the 1970s and onwards was partly also due to an increasing interest in the causal 
mechanisms underlying overt behaviour.  However, cognitive psychology is not based on 
individual introspection. It is therefore somewhat misleading when the term ‘causal 
mechanisms’ is used in this tradition. Rather, it is about structures that stand out for all 
individuals in a specific domain. Noam Chomsky is the primary representative for this kind 
of linguistic philosophy. His grammar was never based on a thorough collection of 
linguistic material with as much variation as possible. His method is not inductive nor 
empirical, but rather deductive and rationalistic. In this way it is linked to Immanuel Kant’s 
notion of a priori analyses, as opposed to a posteriori experiences (Kant, 1781). The pure logic 
is linked to the first term, while all science that is based upon sense experience is associated 
with the latter. Mathematics, which e.g. is based on counting, has some foundation in the 
empirical, but is mainly logical. In this way mathematics gains a medium position in terms 
of synthetic a priori. This Kantian expression may be a good characterization of Chomsky’s 
grammar even if the influence from Descartes is usually more emphasized (cf. Chomsky, 
1966).Through analyses of a highly abstract concept of language with the abovementioned 
status,  he arrives at definitions and conditions that are claimed to be valid for language. ”In 
its attempt to characterize an innate universal grammar common to all human minds, 
Chomsky’s (1957) transformational grammar shared European structuralism’s emphasis on 
abstract structures (…)”(Leahey, 2001, p.294). 
Even though we see similarities, it can be discussed to what extent and how Chomsky has 
influenced cognitive psychology in general and dyslexia research in particular. Thorne & 
Henly (2001) claim, however, ”(…) if there has been a cognitive revolution, no person is 
more responsible for it than Noam Chomsky (..) the interaction between psychology and 
linguistics has strengthened with psychology’s new cognitive focus.” (Thorne & Henley 
2001, p. 538-539) 
3. Options and limitations in the cognitive and linguistic approach to dyslexia 
When reading research within the cognitive approach arrives at so called ‘flow charts’, it is 
not based on inductions that can be falsified. Rather, it is an analysis of what an implicit and 
abstract definition of ‘reading’ involves. It shows what ideally has to be present if something 
is to be characterized as reading. Neither is it a display of causal mechanisms that explain 
why one comes through the routes of the chart with or without particular errors. A typical 
flow chart for reading - or more precisely: decoding – is the so called ‘dual route model’ (c.f. 
early versions in Thomson, 1990). 
When it comes to the transition from one ‘box’ of the chart to another, emphasis is put on 
automatization. It is therefore problematic to state what the cognitive consists of in this case. 
‘Flow charts’ may show what the problem consists of and where in the reading – or 
decoding – process it occurs, but we do not get any explanation of why it happens. It is 
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therefore not a causal model that shows causal mechanisms. At this point behaviourism and 
connectionism have advantages over the cognitive approach.  
Before the ‘cognitive and linguistic turn’ in dyslexia research about 1970, a large emphasis 
was put on visual factors. This emphasis can be traced back to James Hinshelwood who 
claimed in 1895 that ‘word blindness’ was caused by a deficit in visual memory 
(Hinshelwood, 1895). The different versions of this way of thinking have all been causal 
models. ‘The cognitive and linguistic turn’ implied that dyslexia was considered a 
phonological problem, operationalized as difficulties of identifying, analyzing, and 
synthesizing speech sounds and to associate these with letters.  
However, the statements of this approach, only shows what kind of problem dyslexia is. We 
neither get to understand the causal mechanisms nor the aetiology. These are statements 
about what is meant with the term ‘dyslexia’, and therefore the abovementioned elements  
or ‘boxes’ in the flow charts are part of the definition of dyslexia within the cognitive 
approach.  
The International Dyslexia Association adopted in 2002 the definition “Dyslexia is a specific 
learning disability that is neurological in origin. It is characterized by difficulties with 
accurate and/or fluent word recognition and by poor spelling and decoding abilities. These 
difficulties typically result from a deficit in the phonological component of language (...)” 
This quotation gives the impression that the phonological deficit is a cause, but in reality it 
only describes what kind of problem these individuals face. Investigations ‘showing’ that 
phonological difficulties are overrepresented in dyslexics, cannot be described as empirical 
findings, inasmuch as phonological difficulties is part of the definition of dyslexia and 
thereby constitute the conditions for inclusion of individuals in the research samples.  
Rod Nicolson’s (2002) views on the penetration of phonology at different levels of analysis 
may be illustrative of the point we want to make:  
“…phonological training has often been advocated as the appropriate method of 
treatment, thereby implicating phonology in all three levels of analysis – cause, 
symptom and treatment. This penetration of all three levels of analysis explains why 
many researchers and practitioners consider phonology the ‘core’ deficit”. (Nicolson, 
2002:57)  
Cognitive psychology has primarily given us insight in what subtasks reading consists of. 
The diagnosis of dyslexia has through this achievement gained precision. When we know 
what the problems consist of, we are better positioned to make the treatment more efficient. 
Still, much remains to be done when it comes to the methods of remediation of dyslexia. In 
the cognitive tradition, metacognition has been a central keyword. However, there are few 
definitions of metacognition, but it most often seems to presuppose an introspection. This 
involves primarily that the dyslexic becomes aware of where and what the problem is, but 
in order to solve it, more or less behaviouristic elements are applied: repetition and 
automatization. It is a paradox that cognitive psychology has gained a such dominant 
position in special education, all the time it devotes so little attention to what learning is and 
how learning progresses, e.g. questions like: what causal factors promote and obstruct 
learning? 
The lack of precision in the concept of metacognition leaves it with low explanatory power.  
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In cognitive psychology there is an unclear relationship between the pure intellect on one 
side, and emotions and feelings on the other. Due to this it also becomes difficult to explain 
motivation and irrational choices and actions. In this regard we may claim that while 
behaviourism committed a ‚mechanistic fallacy‘, cognitivism committed an‚ intellectualistic 
fallacy‘. From a philosophical point of view we have seen that both these extremes are due 
to a too strong boundary between body and mind. When cognitivism has attempted to 
introduce explanational factors by e.g neuroimaging, there is a missing link between the 
physical and the mental. So called‚ cognitive neuropsychology‘ may often give the 
impression of being an artificial construction. Connectionsim has been more conscient about 
the philosophical, fundamental questions, and has reasonned in a more consequent way 
from the premise that body and mind is a unity and a whole. Still, there is a lack of nuances 
which has the consequence that substantial parts of the human’s experienced reality fall 
outside the boundaries of science. A realistic psychology must discern between‚ inner‘ and 
‚outer‘ without drawing a boundary between mind and body. Later on in this chapter we 
will address the issue that psychology must first decide what reality it intends to study, and 
then next choose the appropriate methods. An important phenomenon to be studied in this 
area of science is ‚skill‘. As we will see, we may in this term combine important insights 
from both behaviourism and cognitivism.  
In order to make progress in science, we need precise and vulnerable definitions. But we 
also need more precision when it comes to how the different concepts and disciplines relate 
to each other:  
“Some researchers and theoreticists have tried to insulate psychology from the other 
sciences, while others have sought to bring it under the banner of a ‘unified science’. In 
my opinion, both of these extreme positions are problematic. We need to combine 
diverse approaches, but not jumble them together. Methaphorically speaking, cognitive 
psychology, behaviourism and neuroscience are each in their own valley, looking up at 
the same mountain-top from their own perspectives. The truth about the mountain-top 
will be revealed only when we listen to what each of the disciplines has to say. 
(Tønnessen, 2000:8) 
Once we realize that we do not all see the mountain-top from the same side, we face 
particular challenges in how to combine our different views so as to understand how they 
may fit together.  
4. Suggestions 
4.1 Conditions for definitions 
Like all science, dyslexia research is dependent on clear and the possibly most relevant 
definitions. The latter means that the definitions need to seize as much as possible of the 
reality to be studied. If we reduce and simplify reality it is easier to obtain clarity, however, 
we run the risk of losing important aspects of the reality to be studied. Behaviourism 
achieved a high degree of clarity, but only by excluding significant parts of the human’s 
experienced reality.  
Reading research – and therefore also dyslexia research - must be based on a definition of 
reading that correspond to our understanding or experience of the phenomenon. We 
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thereby cannot e.g. be content with a definition that implies that an optical scanner actually 
‚reads‘. Nor can we say that the scanner decodes. In case of the scanner, and the underlying 
definition of reading, the verbal meaning is lacking. It also cuts off the consciousness that is 
necessary both to understand what reading is and to explain how and why someone can 
read while others lack this skill. In the same way, ‚Skill‘ is not a phenomenon that we can 
ascribe to a scanner. Before we present hypotheses for defining central issues in reading and 
dyslexia research, we will reflect on some general demands to definitions.  
In order to come continually closer to a more adequate theory, we need hypotheses and 
definitions that are ‘vulnerable’ (Uppstad & Tønnessen, 2007) in the sense that they are not 
only possibly falsifiable. In other words, we should first test those hypotheses that are most 
easily falsifiable. Where the structuralist and generativist definitions turn out to be 
normative, we should search for descriptive, vulnerable definitions. Given a set of 
hypotheses, we should first try to falsify those which can be falsified with practical ease. 
Because of the abstract character of structuralist and generativist definitions of ‘language’, it 
can be questioned whether these approaches can be considered vulnerable; some even reject 
them – and particularly generativist approaches – as being non-falsifiable (Dyvik, 1980; 
Matthews, 1993; Uppstad & Tønnessen, 2007). This empirical problem, which is most easily 
identifiable in the generativist approach, is in our view present in all linguistics theories that 
splits off language use from language system, so-called autonomous linguistics. These build 
upon philosophical conditions with roots in Platonism, and it is therefore difficult or 
impossible to undertake empirical testing of the results or the theories. (see Uppstad, 2005, 
2006; Uppstad & Tønnessen, 2007, 2010).  
The relationship between hypothesis and theory is somewhat controversial, though. A more 
commonsensical view holds that hypotheses are deduced from theory. Contrary to this 
view, the philosophy of Karl Popper suggests that the only way to build an adequate theory 
is to combine an ever-larger number of increasingly tested hypotheses based on 
observations (i.e. ‘bottom-up’ instead of ‘top-down’; Popper, 1965). When we try to falsify 
our hypotheses, our precise empirical statements (hypotheses) will crash more or less with 
‘reality’. On this view, even definitions are considered and treated as hypotheses 
(Tønnessen, 1997). Definitions should be ‘vulnerable’ in similar ways as hypotheses. For this 
reason medical researchers would not base their research on a definition of cancer from the 
1960s, because the definition of cancer has changed as empirical data challenged the 
definition. In research on reading and writing the changes in definitions have been minor 
and less clear. Tønnessen claims that to treat definitions as hypotheses the scientific 
enterprise would be more dynamic:  
“The question of how and if we can define ‘dyslexia’ must, in my opinion, be 
determined by both empirical findings and theoretical reasoning. In order to attend to 
both of these, we need to treat definitions as hypotheses”. (Tønnessen, 1997:84)  
This position is considered to have important consequences for how we conceive of truth in 
science:  
“Looking back at the contributions made by many researchers in the history of our 
field, we often have to ask: which findings are merely true by definition and which are 
truly empirical findings? Assume, for a moment, that we define ‘reading’ as mainly 
decoding, and then define decoding as phonological processing. Should we then be 
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surprised when we find a high correlation between ‘reading difficulties’ and 
‘phonological difficulties’”? (Tønnessen, 1997:85) 
Tønnessen’s notion of truth by definition involves moderate claims of circularity (the most 
extreme circularities being tautologies, e.g.: A = A), and his proposal of treating definitions as 
hypotheses is meant to help find a solution to this problem. If we define ‘bachelor’ as an 
unmarried man, we do not make an empirical finding if we find that the bachelor ‘Pete’ is 
unmarried. If we find, however, that he is greedy, we have an empirical finding.   
Modern linguistics and research on reading and writing have claimed that spoken language 
is primary to written in every important respect (Liberman, 1999; Liberman, Shankweiler & 
Liberman, 1989; Lyons, 1968), a position that has given the notion of phonology an 
axiomatic status in mainstream reading research. Goswami and Bryant (1990) arrived at 
results that in our opinion should have got more influence on reading research in general 
and dyslexia research in particular:  
“The work that we have reviewed in this chapter makes us think it most unlikely that 
the progress that children make in reading is determined by their sensivity to 
phonemes. On the contrary their progress in learning to read (or to read an alphabetic 
script at any rate) is probably the most important cause of awareness of phonemes.” 
(Goswami & Bryant, 1990, p. 26).  
In our view this empirical finding stands in stark contrast to the widespread opinion that 
among others Liberman et al. (1989) defend:   
“What follows, then, is that phonology governs all words, whether dead, living or 
waiting to be born. So whatever else a word is, and regardless of whether it is spoken or 
printed, it is always a phonological structure.” (Liberman, Shankweiler & Liberman, 
1989:8) 
The role of phonology seems to be a truth by definition in Liberman et al.’s way of 
thinking, where a word is defined as a collection of phonemes. The concept of ’phoneme’ 
is in our view an abstraction which was developed after the introduction of written 
language (Uppstad & Tønnessen, 2010). In our view ’meaning’ is both psychologically and 
historically primary. The concept of ’word’ must therefore primarily be defined by 
meaning. Words are entities in language that have a potential for meaning. And this 
meaning potential can be realized in different forms of language, like speech, tactile 
reading, sign language, and reading and writing. The proposed definition of language as 
‘a set of codes with potential for meaning’ is claimed to have a fruitful level of 
generalization, and to contain no a priori assumptions about the relationship between 
spoken and written language.  
Definitions always involve some kind of generalization. The question is how far such 
generalization should be taken, and what justifies the generalization in a given case. Our 
intention here is to say something about generalizations in definitions of ‘language’, but 
let us take a different example first: If we want to generalize from the set of all circles to 
the concept of ‘circle’, we have to set some features of specific circles aside. If we 
investigate circles of different diameters, we will discover that, independently of the 
length of the diameter, the circumference will be about 3.14 times longer (π ≈ 3.14). The 
more general concept of ‘circle’ does not have a fixed circumference or diameter, and we 
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therefore disregard these features, keeping only the constant quotient. This notion of 
‘circle’ is thus more abstract than the notion of ‘a circle whose circumference is 10 cm’. 
The first notion is also very precise by the fact that it encompasses all circles and excludes 
other shapes, like for instance squares. However, if we generalize further to the notion of 
‘figure’, we obtain a notion which is less useful in science. This is because, in the notion of 
‘figure’, we have set aside so many features that it becomes difficult to define. As a result, 
the notion of ‘figure’ lacks precision as compared with that of ‘circle’, by the fact that all 
different shapes are included. Definitions of ‘language’ may be evaluated in a similar 
way. What seems clear is that we need some level of generalization when we define 
‘language’. The distinction between langue/parole and competence/performance is a 
distinction of levels of abstraction. While there clearly is general agreement that the 
definition of ‘language’ should be more general than a description of the features of single 
utterances, modern linguistics chose, at the very beginning, to define ‘language’ in a 
highly abstract way, where the features of the definition rely on theoretical constructions 
which are imposed on the phenomenon to be defined. At its most abstract, ‘language’ is 
defined as ”a set (finite or infinite) of sentences, each finite in length and constructed out 
of a finite set of elements” (Chomsky, 1957:13). In our view this is one of several examples 
of reductionist definitions in Chomsky’s linguistics. If meaning is not included in the 
fundamental definitions, the most important aspects of language are placed outside 
linguistics.  
4.2 Language and skill 
In this chapter, we propose that language is best understood as a skill and not primarily 
as a more or less static system. In doing so, we give a statement of what kind of 
phenomenon language is. Still, language is different from many other human skills, so we 
need a definition of language in order to say what is specific to this kind of skill compared 
to other skills. In this chapter we propose that ‘language’ is to be best defined as ‘a set of 
codes with potential for meaning’. Some will probably object that the notion of ‘potential’ 
is not empirical. It is, however, more problematic to claim that meaning exist 
independently of humans and speech acts. A such platonic inspired theory of meaning is 
in our view more or less explicitly present in most of linguistics. Potentiality is far more 
grounded in empiricism and can be found in physics and chemistry when we say that 
’salt is soluble in water’, ’petrol is flammable’ and ’glass is breakable’. Aristotle claims 
that change makes it necessary to use the term ‘potential’. The existence of a potential can 
be shown by if-then statements. If salt is put into water and dissolves, this shows that salt 
was soluble (had the potentiality) before it was put into water. It is only through 
behaviour that we can determine whether a code has meaning, and possibly what meaning 
it has. The proposed definition is claimed to be at a level of generalization which 
counteracts the disadvantages associated with the highest levels of generalization. The 
new definition does not presuppose a strict symbolic conception of ‘language’, as it 
focuses on the potential for meaning instead of static mental representations. A skill is a 
potential. We only know the potentialities through the realization of them. We know what 
breakability is when we have seen glass been broken, and we know how breakability can 
be realized when we have seen something been broken.  When we say that a skill is a 
potential it means that there is a possibility to perform different actions. We can only 
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study a musical skill through music performance. However, we cannot know for sure that 
the performance gives us a complete picture of the skill in question.  
It is important, both in research and in educational contexts, to distinguish between 
potentialities on the one hand and their actualisations or realisations on the other. For 
example, a person may have excellent musical skills but also suffer from performance 
anxiety or be easily distracted by noise or other sensory impressions. Then a performance 
in a concert hall is likely to fall short of the promise inherent in his or her skills. In such a 
case it is important to take measures that may enhance performance, such as shielding the 
person from impressions and/or giving him or her training in how to ignore factors that 
may disturb or deteriorate performance. By contrast, a person with poor musical skills 
will need different and more fundamental measures. In other words, distinguishing 
between skills as such and their performance is important in both regular and special 
education.  
Through development and learning a skill becomes constantly more stable. However, it 
will never become unchangeable. The skill – which is a potential – therefore has a 
potential of change.  We need to discern between 1) the skill, 2) the acquisition (or 
reduction) of the skill and 3) the realization of the skill. Chomsky defines ‚competence‘ in 
a way that it comprises the innate grammatical structures, while ‚performance‘ concerns 
the use of competence that is dependent on person and situation (Chomsky, 1980). In our 
understanding of Chomsky, ‚competence‘ is universal and unchangeable. Contrary to his 
point of view, we claim that potentials can be developed and that individual differences 
exist. Chomsky also claims that it is wrong to assert that „…evidence about Jone’s 
competence can only be drawn from Jone’s behavior …“ (Chomsky, 2002, p.57). As stated 
above – and in opposition to Chomsky – we suggest that we can only know a skill 
through empirical studies of ‚performances‘. Still, we will never know whether we have 
got a complete picture of the skill.  
The concept of ‘skill’ allows us to unite two of the most important concepts of 
behaviourism and cognitive psychology, respectively: ‘automaticity’ and ‘awareness’. 
This concept can be compared to the third corner of a triangle where the other two corners 
are dominated by behaviourism and cognitive psychology Uppstad & Tønnessen, 
submitted. Good performance of a skill implies a good combination of ‘automaticity’ and 
‘awareness’. The term ‘awareness’ is more appropriate than, for example, ‘metacognition’. 
‘Awareness’ encompasses two main functions: ‘monitoring’ and ‘steering’. Whenever 
automatised actions fail or encounter problems, the person will interfere actively. 
Humans are not rational in a way that they first choose clear and well grounded goals and 
then choose the right tools to reach the goals. Our actions emerge from either spontaneity 
or automatization. If we discover that our actions generate problems, we intervene and 
change the way of acting. In this way our actions become like mutations in nature or 
hypotheses in science: They are adjusted when faced with reality. But because we do not 
know the long term consequences, we have to concentrate on what is immediate and easy 
to test.  
When we study written language skills, it is an important starting point to consider these 
skills in relation to other human skills. The proposed definition of language therefore fills 
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the function of discerning language skills from other human skills, but without giving 
priority to one form of language. Language takes different forms in different parts of the 
world, in different individuals, in different situations and in different sub-cultures. Most 
humans master different forms of language, e.g. both written and spoken language, or 
signed and written language. A definition of language that serves the purpose of 
understanding individual differences and changes, must encompass these different forms of 
language, understood as skills.  
5. Conclusion  
The cognitive and linguistic approach to reading and dyslexia has focussed too much on 
structures, e.g. as expressed in different versions of the ’dual route model’ and the general 
strong focus on phonemes. The dynamics in development and the causal mechanisms has 
only got a subordinate importance. We need a more radical and consequent empiricism 
with emphasis on hypotheses and falsification. This demands more and clearer thinking 
about conditions and definitions on which the hypotheses are based. Research on language, 
reading and dyslexia should therefore put more emphasis on elaboration and clarification of 
the word and concept of ’skill’.  
6. References  
Alexander, P.A. & Fox. E. (2004). A Historical Perspective on Reading Research and Practice. 
In R.B. Rudell & N.J. Unrau (Eds.). Theoretical Models and Processes of Reading, 5th 
Ed.: 33-68. Newark: International Reading Association.  
Beaton, A.A. (2004). Dyslexia, Reading and the Brain. A Sourcebook of Psychological and Biological 
Research. NY: Psychology Press. 
Boder, E. (1973). Developmental Dyslexia: A Diagnostic Approach Based on Three Atypical 
Reading Patterns. Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology, 15: 663-687. 
Chomsky, N. (1957). Syntactic structures. The Hague: Mouton. 
Chomsky, N. (1965). Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Chomsky, N. (1966). Cartesian linguistics: a chapter in the history of rationalist thought. New 
York: Harper & Row.  
Chomsky, N. (1980). Rules and representations.NY: Columbia University press. 
Chomsky, N. (2002) p.57. New horizons in the study of language and mind. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Collins, D.W. & Rourke, B.P. (2003). Learning-Disabled Brains: A Review of the Literature. 
Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 25(7):1011-1034.  
Dyvik, H. (1980). Grammatikk og empiri : en syntaktisk modell og dens forutsetninger [‘Grammar 
and empirical data : a syntactic model and its assumptions’]. Bergen: Universitetet i 
Bergen.  
Gjessing, H.J. (1986). Function Analysis as a Way of Subgrouping Reading Disabled: 
Clinical and Statistical Analyses. Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research, 
30:95-106.  




Definitions and Explanations in Language, Reading and Dyslexia Research 217 
Hinshelwood, J. (1895). Word-Blindness and Visual Memory. The Lancet, 2:1564-1570 
Kant, I. (1781). Critique of pure reason. Translated by Marcus Weigelt. London: Penguin 
Classics 
Leahey, T.H. (2001). A history of modern psychology. NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Liberman, A. M. (1999). The Reading Researcher and the Reading Teacher Need the Right 
Theory of Speech. Scientific Studies of Reading : The official journal of the Society for the 
Scientific Study of Reading 3(2):95–113. 
Liberman, I. Y., Shankweiler, D., & Liberman, A. M. (1989). The Alphabetic Principle and 
Learning to Read. In Donald Shankweiler & Isabel Y. Liberman (Eds.), Phonology 
and reading disability : solving the reading puzzle. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press. 
Lyons, J. (1968). Introduction to theoretical linguistics. London: Cambridge University Press. 
Matthews, Peter H. 1993. Grammatical theory in the United States from Bloomfield to Chomsky. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Miles, T.R. & Miles, E. (2001). Dyslexia. A hundred years on. 2nd Ed. Philadelphia: Open 
University Press. 
Nicolson, R. I. (2002). The Dyslexia Ecosystem. Dyslexia: An International Journal of Research 
and Practice. Vol. 8, pp. 55–66 
Popper, K.R. (1965). Conjectures and refutations: the growth of scientific knowledge (2nd ed.). 
New York: Harper and Row 
Sawyer, D.J. (2006). Dyslexia. A Generation of Inquiry. Topics in Language Disorders. 26(2): 95-
109.   
Shaywitz, S. (2006). Overcoming Dyslexia. A new and Complete Science-Based Program for 
Reading Problems at any Level. NY: Alfred A Knopf.  
Thomson, M. (1990). Developmental Dyslexia. 3rd Ed. London: Whurr Publishers.  
Thorne, B.M. & Henley, T.B. (2001). Connections in the history and systems of psychology. NY: 
Houghton Mifflin Company).  
Tønnessen, F.E. (2000). Explanation or understanding in dyslexia research? Thalamus, Vol. 
18, No. 1 
Tønnessen, F.E. (1997). How Can We Best Define ‘Dyslexia’? Dyslexia: An International 
Journal of Research and Practice, Vol 3, pp. 78–92 
Uppstad, P.H. & Tønnessen, F.E (submitted) Reading - a skill? 
Uppstad, P.H. (2005). Language and Literacy: Some fundamental issues in research on reading and 
writing. Lund: Department of Linguistics and Phonetics, Lund University. 
Unpublished doctoral thesis. 
Uppstad, P.H. (2006). Written language and the notion of 'lexicon'. L1-Educational Studies in 
Language and Literature,Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 85–97 
Uppstad, P.H. & Tønnessen, F.E. (2007). The notion of ’phonology’ in dyslexia research: 
cognitivsm – and beyond. Dyslexia: An International Journal of Research and Practice, 
Vol.  13, No. 3, pp. 154-174 
Uppstad, P.H. & Tønnessen, F.E. (2010). The status of the concept of ‘phoneme’ in 
psycholinguistics. Journal of psycholinguistic research,  Vol. 39, No.5, pp. 429-42 
www.intechopen.com
 
Latest Findings in Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities Research 218 
Vellutino, F.R., Fletcher, J.M., Snowling, M.J., & Scanlon, D. M. (2004). Specific reading 
disability (dyslexia) : what have we learned in the past four decades? Journal of 
Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 45(1):2–40. 
www.intechopen.com
Latest Findings in Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities
Research
Edited by Prof. Uner Tan
ISBN 978-953-307-865-6
Hard cover, 404 pages
Publisher InTech
Published online 15, February, 2012
Published in print edition February, 2012
InTech Europe
University Campus STeP Ri 
Slavka Krautzeka 83/A 
51000 Rijeka, Croatia 
Phone: +385 (51) 770 447 
Fax: +385 (51) 686 166
www.intechopen.com
InTech China
Unit 405, Office Block, Hotel Equatorial Shanghai 
No.65, Yan An Road (West), Shanghai, 200040, China 
Phone: +86-21-62489820 
Fax: +86-21-62489821
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities presents reports on a wide range of areas in the field of
neurological and intellectual disability, including habitual human quadrupedal locomotion with associated
cognitive disabilities, Fragile X syndrome, autism spectrum disorders, Down syndrome, and intellectual
developmental disability among children in an African setting. Studies are presented from researchers around
the world, looking at aspects as wide-ranging as the genetics behind the conditions to new and innovative
therapeutic approaches.
How to reference
In order to correctly reference this scholarly work, feel free to copy and paste the following:
Per Henning Uppstad and Finn Egil Tønnessen (2012). Definitions and Explanations in Language, Reading
and Dyslexia Research, Latest Findings in Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities Research, Prof. Uner
Tan (Ed.), ISBN: 978-953-307-865-6, InTech, Available from: http://www.intechopen.com/books/latest-findings-
in-intellectual-and-developmental-disabilities-research/definitions-and-explanations-in-language-reading-and-
dyslexia-research
© 2012 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This is an open access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
